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Who is in the driving seat? The influence of three small 
countries in the “Cockpit of Europe” on European Union 
integration. 
 
 The 21st century is quickly approaching, bringing with it new way of 
seeing ourselves, and the world in which we live. We live in the platinum 
age, where technology and ease of communication dominate our every day 
lives. The nineteenth century with its empires, and thereafter the birth of 
nationalism is long gone, and new political structures have been developed 
by the various states. Global regionalisation and internationalisation have 
become by-words for the modern political age, with legal structures being 
developed to govern and regulate the ensuing developments. The end of the 
W.W.II witnessed the end of empires, and the fragmentation of original 
power structures into various nation states. Some of these states, particularly 
in Western Europe, saw the strength in safety in numbers, and the benefits 
of pooling of national sovereignty for the benefit of all. Small states, and 
states weak as a result of the W.W.II came together to create International 
organisations and Supra-National bodies, in order to help the Phoenix to rise 
from the ashes. This view was reflected by Sean F. Lemass, a former 
Taoiseach1 when he stated that “only in such a regional grouping” can small 
states “make the best of their resources and potential, preserve and develop 
their cultural heritage”. He even went on to say that small states can “make 
a contribution to the progress of Europe and the World”.2 
 
The first moves in Supranationalism occurred with the forming of the 
European Coal and Steel Community in 1951,3 with the Europe of the six 
eventually developing into what is now the complex and highly successful 
European Union. The success of European experiment has led to other 
regional organisations being founded around the world. Examples of these 
include NAFTA and ASEAN, with the increasing confidence of states 
operating in a shared sovereignty situation giving rise to the founding of the 
World Trade Organisation in 1994 pursuant the Uruguay Round of GATT. 
Each of these organisations is composed of both small and large countries, 
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with small countries no longer feeling intimidated by their larger 
neighbours. The answer to this revolution in global politics in such a short 
period of time since the end of the W.W.II rests with three small countries 
situate in the “Cockpit of Europe”, and with one of them in particular, 
Luxembourg. 
 
The Benelux experiment itself has been used as a model for possible moves 
towards integration by both the Baltic States and the Visegard countries4 
when these two groups of nations were examining possible routes for 
exploiting their new found freedom. The Benelux undertook the initiative 
and invited these countries to “benefit from its experience” in creating free 
trade areas, and other issues pertaining to integration. While the uptake on 
this initiative has been varied, the Benelux foresees a role for itself as 
mentor to other new and evolving states with regard to other integration 
projects in the future.5 
 
 The first moves towards the development of the Benelux were 
signalled by the signing of the 1921 Belgium - Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg Convention. This came into force in 1922, founding the UBEL 
(“L’Union Economic Belgo-Luxembourg”), which operated as an internal 
free trade association between Belgium and Luxembourg, complemented by 
a monetary association, and a common customs frontier. National 
sovereignty in the UBEL was not transferred to a supranational body, but 
rather the sovereignty and political institutions of the two partner states was 
mixed, thereby, from the point of view of Luxembourg, increasing its 
economic space, and gaining it access to the seaboard.6 The UBEL operates 
through a Committee of Ministers, an Administrative Commission, and a 
Council of Customs,7 with the UBEL Committee of Ministers operating 
much in the same was as the later Benelux Committee of Ministers. 
 
 The next sovereignty sharing arrangement entered into by 
Luxembourg and its partners was the agreement on the 5th September 1944 
to the creation of a customs union with Belgium and the Netherlands. This 
became known as the Benelux, with the partner states holding the opinion 
that they had “not only a desire but a obligation to play an active role in 
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world affairs”.8. The creation of the Benelux was taken while the 
governments of the three partner states were still in exile in London. The 
ensuing delay until 1958 in enacting the Benelux Economic Union 
Convention was as a direct result of the “striking difference in post war 
recovery of Belgium and the Netherlands”,9 with the convention being 
structured as an agreement between the Netherlands and the UBEL.10 
 
 The Benelux Customs Union developed into the Benelux Economic 
Union in 1958 with the signing at the Hague on the 3rd of February in that 
year of the Treaty instituting the Benelux Economic Union. This treaty 
states as its aims the co-ordination of policies “in the economic, financial 
and social fields”,11 and the “pursuit of a joint policy in economic relations 
with third countries”.12 Free movement of nationals,13 goods,14 capital,15 and 
services16 are also guaranteed, with a common foreign trade policy to be 
developed.17 Like the Treaty of Rome18 creating the European Common 
Market, the 1958 Customs Union treaty is aspirational in tone, 
encompassing both short term and long term objectives. 19 
 
 The partner states of the Benelux, by virtue of their size, derive a 
higher proportion of their GNP from foreign trade than larger nations of the 
world. Luxembourg and its partners have therefore been guiding the 
development of their foreign policies towards the opening up of new 
commercial markets, with the minimum of “unnecessary political 
involvements”.20 This drive to increase their economic hinterland has led 
the Benelux partner states to develop a dynamic internal and foreign 
Common Commercial Policy with “a relatively higher degree of idealism”21 
coupled with a pragmatic approach to resulting technical and procedural 
problems. 
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 The lack of need for technical regulation of problems amongst the 
partner states has resulted in a steady and unspectacular achievement of 
goals set out in the treaties, with a slow weaving of a coherent whole from 
the legal and administrative tradition of the three partner states. The shared 
national outlooks and political concerns of the Benelux nations have 
contributed to the successful achievement of treaty targets, and the 
development of new and strong modes of economic integration. This 
phenomenon results from the common approach of small states that they are 
not powerful enough to operate on the world stage. This perception of 
relative weakness results in smaller state being “ready to shed the 
inhibitions of sovereignty in an effort to achieve a greater political 
stability”.22 Through time the Benelux states have continuously co-
ordinated their approach to issues arising on both the European and World 
stage, with the European Union’s Council of Ministers receiving 
representations as the Benelux point of view on various issues, as opposed 
to the view points of the separate partner states.  
 
 Within the European Union the continued development of the 
Benelux within the European context was provided for by Article 233 
EEC.23 It was envisaged that the Benelux, as a grouping of three states, 
might be able to circumnavigate some to the pan-European road blocks 
more easily than the Europe of six. It was not envisaged, however, that the 
Benelux Economic Union would become a force for change within the 
European Community itself.24 The Benelux has been, and continues to be a 
trail blazer for the European Union in areas such as Common Commercial 
Policy, internal market issues, customs union, transport, administration, 
etc.25 In addition, the Benelux countries have developed areas of co-
operation yet to be addressed by the European Union, such as the “co-
ordination of sea port policies, physical planning... and landscape and nature 
conservation”.26 
 
 An examination of the topic of road haulage cabotage is instructive in 
the comparison of the integration of the Benelux and the EU. In a true single 
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market the movement of goods from one part of the market to the other 
should operate unhindered. Any obstacles placed in the way of road hauliers 
impede the flow of goods, resulting in a distorted cost structure and 
avoidable expense and competition distortion in the eyes of the consumer. 
By December 1992 Benelux liberation of road haulage was “completed”27 
with true cabotage28 operating amongst the partner states. By contrast a 
common inland transport policy pursuant to Council Regulation 1017/68 
has been slow in maturing in the European Community. By 1993 the 
European Community was still operating on the basis of licences granted on 
the qualitative criteria29 with an initial limited measure of liberalisation of 
road haulage introduced by Council Regulation in 198930 to enter into force 
in 1998. This limited freedom is subject to the haulier obtaining community 
authorisation to be issued by the competent authorities of Member States, 
thus precluding the development of a true single market in Road 
Transport.31 
 
 Another example of the precursive role of the Benelux is the 
Convention d’Union du Territoire Douanier Benelux. This Convention, 
together with its Protocol, which came into force on the 1st February 197132 
effectively created a single Benelux market, a full 20 years before the 
adoption of the highly problematic Single European Act 1992 of the 
European Community. 
 
 The trade association movement has gone from strength to strength 
around the world, with various states making local and global commitments 
to lower trade barriers. The concept of free trading blocks with common 
customs frontiers have been developed in the various global regionalisations 
that are coming to the fore as we reach the end of the 20th Century. A new 
chapter in European integration has recently been opened, with the 
launching of European Monetary Union pursuant to Article 3A EC.33 The 
pursuit of monetary union brings with it the need to co-ordinate supporting 
policies, amongst them economic policy34 and monetary policy,35 as has 
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been provided for in the EC Treaty.36 Monetary Union without political 
union may to some be a radically new idea, but for two of the EU member 
states, namely Belgium and Luxembourg, operating as the UBEL, this is an 
area in which they have over fifty years of experience. Monetary 
associations and full recognition of another’s currency, has long been the 
practice with regard to the circulation of the Belgian Franc in 
Luxembourg.37 The complexities involved in monetary union, and the 
courage required by the UEBL in taking such a step so many years ago is 
only now being fully appreciated with the advent of European Monetary 
Union, and the impending arrival of the euro in the citizen’s pocket.  
 
Monetary Union in the UBEL context includes, amongst other issues, 
the holding of gold and foreign exchange reserves in common, being 
managed by the “Institute Belgo-Luxembourgeoise du Change” with 
Luxembourg dispensing with the need for its own central or issuing bank.38 
The currencies of the two countries have been managed by the “Institute 
Belgo-Luxembourg du Change” a precursor of the European Central Bank 
designated to manage EMU under Article 109 EC. 
 
 The Benelux Union treaty for its part provides for the co-ordination 
of, in addition to investment and monetary policy, social policy. It is 
recognised by Belgium and Luxembourg that monetary union requires co-
ordination and the gradual harmonisation of fiscal and social policy.39 The 
Benelux has come to recognise that major differences in fiscal and social 
policy can give rise to “serious distortions in the exercise of freedom of 
establishment and the carrying on of economic activities”40 in partner states, 
with the debate amongst Benelux partner states currently being conducted 
on these issues.41 These deliberations in the Benelux forum have yet to be 
echoed at the EU level, but could well signal the path that will be taken by 
the European Union in pursuant of further integration and in support of the 
naissant euro in the not too distant future. 
 
 Another recent European Union development, Schengen, owes it 
genesis directly to the Benelux. The Schengen Convention, initiated by 
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France, Germany and the Benelux, to operate as a pilot project for the 
Community as a whole, has as its aim the free movement of both persons 
and goods. This reflects the 1960 Benelux development when the Benelux 
partner states transferred control of the free movement of persons through 
their external borders to the Benelux framework.42 It was the Benelux itself, 
through its Committee of Ministers, which took the initiative in approaching 
both the French and German governments, requesting the issue of a gradual 
suppression of frontier controls for free movement amongst the five 
countries. The Benelux felt capable of broaching the issue at the level of the 
EU, as they had benefited from over 10 years experience within the Benelux 
of such an arrangement.43 The Secretariat of the Benelux even took over the 
ensuing five years of difficult negotiations of the Schengen Convention. 
Issues to be addressed included organised crime, drugs and arms trafficking, 
international terrorism, the issuing of visas to third country nationals, and 
issues of asylum and refugee status. In order for the Convention to operate 
effectively the issue of International Legal and Judicial Co-operation has 
also to be addressed, not only by the four working groups set up by the 
European Commission to deal with this new policy, but also by the Trevi 
Group.44 Many of these issues were resolved by recourse to the tried and 
tested solutions of the Benelux. The flexible approach to shared competency 
of the smaller organisation could not be replicated in the Schengen 
Convention, which had to address the needs and fears of more bureaucratic 
and regulated states, such as France and Germany. 
 
 In summation, the Benelux confers a dual benefit on its partner states. 
Firstly, it acts as protector of the interests of the countries within the larger 
forum of the EU. It fulfils this role by operating as an “instrument” by 
which three small states can occupy a prominent position on the European 
stage, and command greater respect than they could severally, thereby 
preventing them from being marginalised in the larger, and ever expanding 
European Union. The Benelux secretariat foresees its role in the future not 
only of protecting its own partner states but, more ambitiously, in the more 
altruistic role as a guardian of the interests of all smaller member states of 
the European Union.45 
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 The second benefit to the Benelux partner states is the role that has 
fallen to the Benelux as precursor to the EU in matters pertaining to 
integration. The ability of the three smaller states to take a pragmatic 
approach to the problems they have encountered on the road to integration, 
and to adopt new and innovative policies in the face of a changing economic 
and political environment, adds to the potency of the Benelux in a world 
composed of an ever increasing number of small states. By virtue of their 
constant examination of external forces and trends, and because they are 
often less engrossed with internal regional or racial tensions smaller states 
“often have a contribution to make towards international co-operation, 
simply because they are small states”.46 
 
 The Benelux have, however, diverged from the path taken by the EU 
in some areas of integration, such as with regard to defence and foreign 
policy. Here the Benelux partner states have agreed that they can co-operate 
“provided there is a real need for such co-operation and it has a reasonable 
chance of success”.47 This perhaps could provide a lesson the European 
Union, whose efforts to create a more structured Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, pursuant to Pillar II of the TEU, has been, to date, 
something of an embarrassment to its supporters. As appears to be the case 
with most Benelux policies, this co-operation “should be specific and based 
on pragmatic considerations”,48 this pragmatism providing fewer stumbling 
blocks to the Benelux that the more idealistic and doctrinal backdrop to 
many of the European Union’s own integration policies. 
 
The records show the important and ongoing input that three small states in 
the “cockpit of Europe” have had to date on issues pertaining to European 
wide integration. This input into integration philosophy and experience has 
been largely successful, and highly beneficial for the Benelux states. The 
benefits of this experiment have also been reaped at a cost of  “the princely 
sum of six Belgian Francs” per each Benelux citizen, a year.49 This return 
on investment is particularly high, while the lessons of an efficient and cost-
effective bureaucracy could yet prove invaluable of the lumbering giant on 
the Kirchberg plateau. The Benelux secretariat has looked into the crystal 
ball, and predicts for itself a bright future within the new Europe, stating 
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that the “Benelux Economic Union must continue to serve as a laboratory, 
the model and the motor of European Integration”.50 
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